Ukraine: The Russian threat and the European incertitude

Abstract: This article highlights the existential urgency of the Russian threat often underestimated in the West. It provides a historical overview of the conflict since 2014, covering Ukraine’s 1991 independence, the Holodomor trauma, and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. It details the illegal occupation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, driven by the ideology of “Russkiy Mir”. The text contrasts Ukraine’s unwavering resistance and hope for EU/NATO entry with Europe’s occasional timid attitudes and indecisiveness in acting unanimously. The conclusion expresses the hope that Europe will recognize the changed world order and aspire to be the leader of its own and Ukraine’s future security to prevent decay.

Introduction: The Perspective from the Baltic Front

As I write this article, I am in Estonia, a land currently wrapped in a thick blanket of snow and a biting cold that has flooded Eastern Europe in recent weeks. In the city center of Tallinn, a massive Ukrainian flag stands out prominently; in every corner of the capital, it is possible to encounter messages of support for Kyiv and the courageous resistance of its people against the Russian armed forces. This geographical proximity to the conflict provides a different lens to view the war, a lens of existential urgency that is frequently missing in the West. 

Too often, there is a tendency to underestimate what is happening just a few thousand kilometres from our homes, attempting to evade the most negative and dire perspectives for the future of Europe. In truth, the propensity for indifference is not shared by all European states, however it has seen a significant increase in recent years. This apathy has indeed left room for subtle and dangerous injections of Russian propaganda into our society. From talk shows to newspapers and social networks, the Kremlin’s narrative has easily found space in the daily lives of Europeans, exploiting weaknesses, democratic hesitations, and economic fears, leading many to doubt the factual reality that surrounds them. 

The objective of this article is to establish a narrative as closely aligned with the facts as possible, offering the reader a brief but comprehensive historical overview of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which began in 2014, and not just in 2022. It is the duty of every free citizen to deeply understand the reasons behind this bloody war, to read daily updates with a critical eye, and to remain conscious of the difficult geopolitical situation preceding Russia’s further violation four years ago.

1991: The First Steps of the Newborn Ukraine and the Ghost of the USSR

Image 4: CCIPU, https://www.ccipu.org/news/trenta-anni-fa-gli-ucraini-dicevano-si-allindipendenza

Emerging from the collapsing structures of the Soviet Union and declaring independence on August 24, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada, —the Ukrainian Parliament, —vigorously sang the patriotic song “Oy u luzi chervona kalyna“. Accompanying the Ukrainian banner through the Hall, the deputies marked a path toward a long-awaited and dreamed-of independence. This moment was not merely political; it was a psychological rebirth for a nation that had been suppressed for decades. 

Historically, the Soviet Union was often seen by Ukrainians as both a consolatory refuge during the Iron Curtain and Cold War eras and as a “stepmother” figure capable of causing hunger, death, and genocide. The Holodomor, the man-made famine, specifically led to the death of approximately five million people (according to Soviet estimates) between 1932 and 1933. This historical trauma remains a cornerstone of Ukrainian national identity.

Thus, August 1991 marked the definitive cutting of the umbilical cord with the Soviet Union, which would collapse exactly five months later on Christmas night. At that moment, another flag took center stage, hoisted above the highest dome of the Kremlin: that of the Russian Federation. Ukraine would have to reckon with this new entity for years to come, watching its politicians and major parties plan economic and political deals that often served Moscow’s interests more than Kyiv’s. 

On December 1, 1991, the population of Ukraine had the opportunity to declare themselves for or against the independence invoked by the Rada. The results of this referendum are an essential starting point for understanding the country’s future political developments. Out of 24 Oblasts (regions), one Autonomous Republic (Crimea), and due cities with special status (Kyiv and Sevastopol), with approximately 31,900,000 voters, 90%¹voted in favor of independence. 

Simultaneously, Leonid Kravchuk was elected as the first President of Ukraine. It is vital to keep these figures in mind, especially regarding the eastern regions like Donetsk and Luhansk. It was here that, despite the proximity to Russia being both an attraction and a threat, citizens overwhelmingly sanctioned their will to be independent during that first vote. However, from this great moment of unity, the “social glue” and genuine aspiration for a common democratic future slowly began to fade under the weight of economic crisis and corruption.

Ukraine in the New Millennium: A Nation Divided by History

Image 5: Wikipedia, Memorandum of Budapest, 1994 https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memorandum_di_Budapest 

The first leadership class with which the newborn Ukraine had to deal with was the last Soviet nomenklatura, a factor that cannot be minimized.  The country heavily suffered from its communist past, and its society developed while looking back at the structures of the old regime. This created a “hybrid” state where democratic institutions existed on paper but were controlled by oligarchic interests.  Ukrainian national consciousness is quite young in terms of its current effective borders, as there have historically been two different modus operandi in Ukrainian cultural and social development.

We see Western Ukraine versus Eastern Ukraine: on one side, the “modern” and European-oriented Lviv and Kyiv; on the other, the heavy industry, steel mills, and coal mines of Donetsk and Luhansk. One side has always looked West with hope; the other side, including Russophone cities like Mariupol and Kharkiv, felt a cultural and economic proximity to the Russian Federation that created a massive rift with the capital.

The Western Oblasts, particularly those corresponding to Habsburg-era Galicia, enjoyed a cultural fertility and political tolerance that allowed Ukrainian (then Ruthenian) nationalism to survive even the Soviet era. This historical context explains why regional composition defines the political orientations of the local population. 

Since the elections of 1994 and 1998, Ukrainian regionalism has played a fundamental role in national and foreign policy. The western part remains expressly pro-Western, while the south and east were often drawn toward the Russian sphere, viewing Euro-Atlantic integration with suspicion. This polarization led to internal tensions, exacerbated by the economic collapse following the fall of the USSR. Unlike neighbors such as Poland or Hungary, Ukraine failed to achieve a relaxed democratic climate. This was largely due to the inability to change the leadership class. 

The presidencies of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma transformed Ukraine’s semi-presidentialism into a de facto presidentialism where legality was managed through non-transparent methods. During this period, the country was a “hybrid democracy” characterized by strong authoritarianism and a lack of transparency². 

Moreover, something more happened immediately after the Declaration of Independence by Ukraine, which deeply affected its own future security. On December 5, 1994, Ukraine, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom signed this agreement in Budapest, in which Ukraine committed to denuclearisation by acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and transferring Soviet-era nuclear weapons to Russia. In exchange, signatories provided security assurances respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and borders. The deal followed the 1994 Trilateral Statement and addressed Ukraine’s large nuclear arsenal post-Soviet collapse.

The European Union and the “Russia First” Policy

Initial contacts with the European Union (EU) occurred under President Kuchma in 1998 through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). 

While the EU declared support for Ukrainian democracy, the primary objective of European leaders at the time was “Russia First”, —prioritizing a stable and profitable relationship with the Russian Federation³. Consequently, Ukraine saw its democratic transition managed by an inadequate establishment while its most important political partner (the EU) moved closer to its greatest threat. 

In 2001, another agreement was signed in the form of an Action Plan (AP), covering justice and internal affairs. However, the three years in between were marked by half-hearted reforms and mutual distrust. As a result, Ukraine’s international diplomatic vector shifted toward Russia, benefiting Vladimir Putin, —who became President in 2000, —and the Kremlin’s persistent imperialist logic. 

In 2004, the situation reached a boiling point. The population manifested its exhaustion and protested against the pro-Russian President Kuchma and his successor-designate, who were accused of massive electoral fraud. The Orange Revolution was a watershed moment; Mikhail Gorbachev compared it to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 due to its democratic echo. This movement instilled the necessary “ardor” in Ukrainians to rebel against an establishment influenced by Moscow⁴. 

Viktor Yushchenko was eventually declared the winner of the 2005 elections, supported by Yulia Tymoshenko and the socialist leader Moroz, all united by the “European factor”. Despite this momentum, the EU was unable to fully seize the political and emotional opportunity. The 2005 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) aimed to guarantee stability, but it focused more on realpolitik and pragmatic geopolitical interests than on a clear path to membership. European diplomacy showed a certain “laziness,” preferring to maintain the paradigm of Ukraine as a buffer state. Interviews from 2010 revealed that Ukrainian EU membership⁵ was hindered not only by internal economic flaws but by a desire not to upset the precarious balance with the Russian Federation.

From Euromaidan to the Illegal Occupation of Crimea

Image 6: Radio Free Europe, Euromaidan revolution https://www.rferl.org/amp/euromaidan-politics-ukraine/26648497.html

This European reluctance, combined with a deteriorating internal political class, eventually handed the country back to the Russian sphere. Hopes for a bilateral agreement were buried in 2010 with the election of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych⁶. His mandate was characterized by non-transparent economic deals and eventually led to the Maidan protests (Euromaidan).

Between November 2013 and February 2014, hundreds of thousands of people (estimates suggest between 500,000 and 800,000) protested Yanukovych’s failure to ratify an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU⁷, choosing instead a 15-billion-ruble pact with Russia⁸.

These protests, and the subsequent violent crackdown, led to the fall of the regime. Yanukovych fled to Moscow, seeking asylum in the Kremlin. This opened three scenarios: the election of the pro-Western Petro Poroshenko, the illegal Russian invasion of Crimea, and the start of the war in Donbas. 

Image 7: AFP, Getty Images

In March 2014, in total defiance of international law, Russian troops occupied Crimea. Moscow justified this as “self-determination” for pro-Russian citizens. Among those most affected by this occupation are the Crimean Tatars, an indigenous group whose history is linked to Turkish culture and Islam. Russian authorities implemented repressive policies, obstructing Tatar political activity during the 2014 referendum, which was judged invalid by UN Resolution 68/262. Since 2014, Crimean Tatars have been excluded from human rights monitoring and forced to accept Russian citizenship or lose fundamental rights. Reports from the Council of Europe⁹ and the OSCE¹⁰ describe a climate of fear¹¹¹².

Approximately 5,000 Tatars fled to Ukraine, and many remain missing or arbitrarily detained. In 2016, Russia declared the Mejlis (the Tatar Assembly) an “extremist organization”, effectively criminalizing the political representation of an entire ethnic group.

The War in Donbas and the Ideology of “Russkiy Mir”

Simultaneously, Moscow opened a front in the Donbas region, driven by the ideology of Russkiy Mir (Russian World)¹³. This belief holds that Russian-speaking populations must be “protected” from “forced Ukrainization”. In 2014, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions saw the declaration of the Crimean People’s Republic (DNR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), supported by Russian military assets. The Minsk I (2014) and Minsk II (2015) agreements failed to end the conflict as the Kremlin intended to transform its influence into a de facto occupation. Meanwhile, the conflict was intensifying the clash between Ukrainophones and Russophones. 

A study by the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS)¹⁴ between 2016 and 2019 showed that while 50% of the population in the conflict zone considered Russian their mother tongue, 65% of citizens in Kyiv-controlled areas favored reintegration into a sovereign Ukraine without special autonomy. Even in occupied DNR and LNR, 55% supported a return to Ukraine, directly contradicting Kremlin disinformation. 

To further erode Ukrainian identity, Russia employed “passportization“¹⁵, —issuing over 530,000 Russian passports to residents of the autonomous republics by mid-2021. This was a clear strategy to create a “human shield” of Russian citizens, providing a pretext for further military intervention. The human cost has been staggering: 120,000 internally displaced persons since 2014, the systematic deportation of children, and the destruction of educational infrastructure to force “Russification”. 

There is a direct correlation between the Kremlin’s repressive policies and its military actions; the bombing of schools and infrastructure is designed to devastate both economic rights and the cultural identity of the local population. It is upon this identity, constantly undermined by Russian propaganda, that the current research must focus, as it remains the ultimate shield against total subjugation. The pretext, cited above and manufactured silently during the passportization process, was immediately used by the Kremlin in February 2022, when the daily life of Ukrainians was disrupted by the first Russian tanks and soldiers entering the sovereign territory of their own homeland. 

What about now?

Image 8: Source: RSI, https://www.rsi.ch/info/mondo/I-leader-europei-serrano-i-ranghi-per-l’Ucraina–2638257.html

The night of February 24, four years ago, dramatically marked the hearts of the Ukrainian people, leaving space for perdition, pain, blood, and a thirst for justice. From that day onward, Kyiv began to know the sound of air raid sirens, of military air defences intent on eliminating Russian drones that pierce the air defenses. 

Ukraine has been resisting imperviously, without any kind of weariness, against the brutal and ruthless force of the Kremlin, upholding high the value of its people and the pride of a young nation but with millennial origins. The country had to face difficult political periods, corruption scandals, and changes in international leadership, which undoubtedly contributed to a general redefinition of the country’s political-diplomatic approach toward a just and lasting peace. 

While Kyiv never wavered, looking with hope toward entry into the EU and NATO (this aspiration emerging only after Russian boots on the ground in Ukraine), national unity allowed the internal party scene in Ukraine to be solidary and close to President Zelensky’s actions (in office since 2019 and Russian-speaking)., Europe, on the other hand, has not always been found ready.

Considering the cases in which the European Union presented itself as a united block while facing the Russian threat (see the nineteenth sanction packages against Russia and the recent 90 billion loan to Kyiv for 2026-2027), at the same time many have been the moments in which European chancelleries have stammered in declaring complete and total support for the Ukrainian resistance. 

By overlooking the Trojan horses in the European assembly, community institutions have not infrequently found arid terrain among Member States in acting unanimously with immediacy and frankness. The most concrete examples are rather recent, and concern the incursion of Russian drones into NATO territory and the use of frozen Russian funds in Belgian banks. 

Regarding the first case, NATO promptly activated the Eastern Sentry mission, despite European partners of the Alliance being indecisive on how to react politically and militarily to violations of NATO airspace by Russian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). 

The second example concerns the exhausting indecision that accompanied the EU and Member States in deciding whether and how to use the money of the Russian Federation and its citizens deposited in Brussels banking institutions. In that case, once again after many similar occasions, Europe, out of fear of Moscow and of potential economic and legal retaliations, decided to downplay its “repressive” action against the Russians, leaving the latter unscathed from more radical coercive measures. 

Europe, therefore, resuming what was said in the previous paragraphs, has indeed redeemed itself from the then-priority “Russia first” policy, but has maintained, in alternating phases, submissive, almost timid attitudes toward Russia, wanting to preserve its own reputation of who “discusses” and “condemns.” Unfortunately, however, as noted by the new German Chancellor Merz at Davos (Switzerland) last January 22, the world surrounding Europe has totally changed, the values in which we believed are obscured or even vanished before constant violations of international norms. Economic interests and military and political power have taken over, and Europe, starting from Ukraine, must take note and aspire to be the leader of its own future. At all costs, in every way, for its security and that of Ukraine. Otherwise? If it were not so, the Old Continent will die, decay, and end up in the hostile hands of its enemies.

1.  https://www.ccipu.org/news/trenta-anni-fa-gli-ucraini-dicevano-si-allindipendenza – Dati Referendum per l’indipendenza Ucraina del 1991, consultato il 18/04/2025 ↩︎
2. Paul Kubicek, Problems of Post-Post-Communism: Ukraine after the Orange Revolution‘, Democratization, vol. 16, no. 2, 2009, p. 326 in “Democracy beyond the Rhetoric and the Emergence of the “EU Prince”: The Case of EU-Ukrainian Relations”, 2010, p.11 ↩︎
3.   Iryna Solonenko ‘The EU Impact on Democratic Transformation in Ukraine’, in Stephen Velychenko, Ukraine, ‘The EU and Russia’, 2007, p.140 ↩︎
4.  Iryna Solonenko ‘The EU Impact on Democratic Transformation in Ukraine’, in Stephen Velychenko, Ukraine, ‘The EU and Russia’, 2007, p.140 ↩︎
5.  Chris Patten, Paper prepared for European Neighbourhood Policy and Democracy Promotion, 2010 ↩︎
6.  Sarah Whitmore, Political party development in Ukraine, 2014, pp.3-4 ↩︎
7.  Zona di libero scambio globale e approfondito, consultato il 19/03/25 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/LSU/?uri=uri serv%3 AOJ.L.2014.161.01.0003.01.ITA  ↩︎
8.  Winter on fire, regia di Evgeny Afineevsky, 2016, consultato il 25/04/25 e visualizzato nel febbraio 2023 https://www.cinematografo.it/film/winter-on-fire-l7s68p9e  ↩︎
9.  Consiglio d’Europa, Crimeans Tatars’ struggle for human rights, 18 aprile 2023 ↩︎
10.  OSCE – ODHIR, Report on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, war crimes and crimes against humanity, aprile – giugno 2022 ↩︎
11.  OHCHR, Ten Years of Occupation by the Russian Federation: Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Ukraine, 28 febbraio 2024 ↩︎
12.  OHCHR, Ten Years of Occupation by the Russian Federation: Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Ukraine, 28 febbraio 2024 ↩︎
13.  La Stampa, Che cos’è “Russkiy Mir” , la vera ideologia alla base del putinismo, 27 marzo 2022, consultato il 29/05/25, https://www.lastampa.it/esteri/2022/03/27/news/che-cos-e-russkiy-mir-la-vera-ideologia-alla-base-del-putinismo-1.41332232/amp/  ↩︎
14.  G. Sasse e A. Lackner, Attitudes and identi- ties across the Donbas front line: What has changed from 2016 to 2019?, ZOiS Report 3 / 2019 ↩︎
15.  F. Burkhardt, M. Rabinovych, C. Wittke e E. Bescotti, Passportization, Diminished Citizenship Rights, and the Donbas Vote in Russia’s 2021 Duma Elections (TCUP Report), Cambridge: Harvard University, Ukrainian Research Institute, Temerty Contemporary Ukraine Program, 2022 ↩︎